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which states that since physical phenomena arises within consciousness,

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you mean perception of physical phenomena, not actual physical phenomena right?

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Yes, thank you.

With one addendum: it is not entirely clear that the two can be divorced from one-another, but that is a much more complex discussion (hopefully) for another time. On this point, see Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.

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So your point is that it takes a conscious entity to perceive the physical world and that somehow shows that the brain isn't the cause of consciousness? That's some pretty flawed logic there. I think you're saying that because the conscious is the thing doing the perceiving of physical phenomena therefore physical phenomena can't be the cause of consciousness. However, you're not conscious of your brain activity, only the results of that activity. So if you preposition is that consciousness must be separate from what it is perceiving (and not caused by it) and it doesn't perceive the activity of the brain, there's no reason why the activity of the brain can't be the cause of consciousness.

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Smack, we would have to get into some pretty technical stuff to make sense of how the mind organizes its phenomena, but suffice it to say that ever since Kant it has been pretty well demonstrated that "physical phenomena" is not separate from the activity of the mind. Indeed, in order for us to have knowledge of the world, and not be forever separated from a world outside of our consciousness, the mind must have as one of its primary functions the ordering of phenomena into a form that is knowable and demonstrable. The word "phenomena" should serve as a clue here. Phenomena means that which appears. Something that appears must appear to someone. Thus, phenomena (physical as well) is something appears to us, or is experienced by us.

This doesn't mean that if we are not always conscious of something it ceases to act, but it does mean that physical interaction is dependent upon the mind. Mind here means a principle of organization, not a momentary focus on something.

You suggest that we are not conscious of the brain's activity, and yet it remains true that we only know of what we term the "brain's activity" insofar as it has entered into our experience, in this case science (neuroscience). The findings of neuroscience are experienced, that is, they arise within consciousness, not outside of it.

We can suggest therefore that neuroscience is a certain form of experience, a mode of consciousness. But the converse is not true. Experience or consciousness is not a certain form of neuroscience. Were we to represent this in vin diagrams, the larger circle would be experience and neuroscience would fit wholly within it. Experience precedes (ontologically) neuroscience.

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